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Abstract In the present study, we examined the relation
between memory for a consequential and emotional event
and memory for the circumstances in which people learned
about that event, known as flashbulb memory . We
hypothesized that these two types of memory have different
determinants and that event memory is not necessarily a direct
causal determinant of flashbulb memory. Italian citizens (N =
352) described their memories of Italy’s victory in the 2006
FootballWorld Cup Championship after a delay of 18months.
Structural equation modeling showed that flashbulb memory
and event memory could be clearly differentiated and were
determined by two separate pathways. In the first pathway,
importance predicted emotional intensity, which, in turn,
predicted the frequency of overt and covert rehearsal.
Rehearsal was the only direct determinant of vivid and
detailed flashbulb memories. In the second pathway,
importance predicted rehearsal by media exposure, which
enhanced the accuracy and certainty of event memory. Event
memory was also enhanced by prior knowledge. These results
have important implications for the debate concerning
whether the formation of flashbulb memory and event
memory involve different processes and for understanding
how flashbulb memory can be simultaneously so vivid and
so error-prone.
Keywords Flashbulbmemory . Eventmemory . Public
events . Autobiographical memory
Walking the streets of a large Italian city at 10:40 PM on July
9, 2006, no one is around, and a mysterious silence enshrouds
the city. Behind the windows, blue light flickers. Suddenly, an
immense, unitary cry of joy pierces the silence. People flood
the streets, honking car horns, setting off firecrackers, waving
Italian tricolor flags, and chanting. A celebration explodes that
will last the whole night everywhere in Italy: The Italian
National Team had won the 2006 World Cup Football
Championship. How did Italians appraise this event?
How did they feel about it? A year and a half later,
what would they remember about it? In the present
study, we examined a positive flashbulb memory. We
examined the factors that shaped people’s memories of
both the event itself and the circumstances in which
they had learned about it. The aims were to determine whether
event memory and flashbulb memory have different
determinants, and thus different characteristics, shedding light
on the enduring puzzle of why flashbulb memories often
combine inaccuracy with striking vividness and subjective
certainty.
Autobiographical memory and emotion: The concept
of flashbulb memory
Autobiographical memory refers to the maintenance of self-
related information, especially experiences that are
indispensable to our identities (Baddeley, 1990; Brewer,
1986). In Conway’s model (e.g., Conway, 2005; Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), autobiographical memory includes
information at three levels of specificity: lifetime periods
(e.g., “When I was at university”), general events (e.g., “Our
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trip to Florence”), and event-specific knowledge (e.g., “When
I saw Botticelli’s Allegory of Spring at the Uffizi Gallery”).
Flashbulb memories fall into Conway’s third category, event-
specific knowledge, and consist of representations of personal
experience (e.g., “I remember seeing Messi score a goal”)
rather than semantic knowledge (e.g., “I know that Messi
scored a goal”). Proposed more than 30 years ago by R.
Brown and Kulik (1977), the concept of “flashbulb
memories” refers to detailed, long-lasting, and vividmemories
of the personal circumstances in which people first heard
about an unexpected, consequential, and emotion-arousing
event. Some researchers have argued that flashbulb memories
do not comprise a distinct subtype of episodic memory with
special characteristics, and that the term has outlived its
usefulness (e.g., McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988). Others
have argued, however, that these memories are characterized
by unusual vividness, subjective certainty, and longevity, if
not accuracy (e.g., Talarico & Rubin, 2007). Because of these
characteristics, flashbulb memory continues to be a
topic of strong interest to both memory researchers and the
public (e.g., Day & Ross, in press; Hirst et al., 2009;
Koppel, Brown, Stone, Coman, & Hirst, 2013; Kraha
& Boals, in press).
As originally defined by R. Brown and Kulik (1977),
flashbulb memories are similar to photographs in their level
of perceptual vividness. They are formedwhen an event elicits
a high degree of surprise, is important to the individual, and/or
evokes intense emotional arousal. By analyzing numerous
events with these characteristics, R. Brown and Kulik showed
that the resulting memories typically contain information that
falls into the following categories: place , ongoing activity,
informant , own affect , other affect , and aftermath . In addition
to these “canonical” categories, flashbulb memories
sometimes contain idiosyncratic information, (e.g., the color
of clothing worn by people present when the news was
received). Importantly, both the canonical and idiosyncratic
details concern the context in which the news of the event was
received rather than the event itself.
Since the original work by R. Brown and Kulik (1977),
many studies of flashbulb memories have been conducted by
examining people’s reports concerning dramatic and emotion-
arousing events such as the explosion of the Challenger space
shuttle (Bohannon, 1988; Neisser & Harsch, 1992), the
September 11 terrorist attacks (Hirst et al., 2009;
Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Foley, & Kornbrot, 2009;
Lee & Brown, 2003; Luminet & Curci, 2009; Luminet et al.,
2004; Pezdek, 2003; Silver, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin, &
Gil-Rivas, 2002; M. C. Smith, Bibi, & Sheard, 2003;
Tekcan, Ece, Gülgöz, & Er, 2003), or the death of important
public people (e.g., W. J. Brown, Basil, & Bocarnea, 2003;
Curci, Luminet, Finkenauer, & Gisle, 2001; Day & Ross, in
press; Finkenauer et al., 1998; Tinti, Schmidt, Sotgiu, Testa, &
Curci, 2009).
Most studies of flashbulb memories have focused on
negative events, but a few have compared the characteristics
of flashbulb memories for negative and positive events. The
results have generally confirmed the presence of the
“canonical” categories identified by R. Brown and Kulik
(1977), regardless of the event’s valence (e.g., Berntsen &
Thomsen, 2005; Kraha & Boals, in press; Scott & Ponsoda,
1996). Differences between positive and negative flashbulb
memories have also been found, but the precise nature of these
differences has varied from study to study. Several studies
have indicated that, relative to negative events, flashbulb
memories of positive events tend to be more rehearsed, more
vivid, and accompanied by a greater sense of reliving (e.g.,
Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005; Bohn & Berntsen, 2007; Breslin
& Safer, 2011; Talarico & Moore, 2012). The findings
regarding accuracy have been less consistent, with some
showing greater accuracy for positive events (e.g., Breslin &
Safer, 2011; Kraha & Boals, in press), and others showing
greater accuracy for negative events (e.g., Bohn & Berntsen,
2007; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; see also Basso, Schefft,
Ris, & Dember, 1996; Levine & Bluck, 2004) or no
differences (Talarico & Moore, 2012).
Regardless of whether memorywas assessed for positive or
negative events, these studies partially challenge and partially
confirm R. Brown and Kulik’s original claims concerning
flashbulb memories. In contrast to those claims, flashbulb
memories are far from being like photographs, because they
change over time and contain numerous inaccuracies (Larsen,
1992; Neisser, 1986; Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Talarico &
Rubin, 2003). Consistent with R. Brown and Kulik’s claims,
however, flashbulb memories seem to have characteristics that
render them different from other types of memories. For
instance, they are characterized by a higher level of vividness
and subjective certainty (Talarico & Rubin, 2003, 2007).
People interviewed about the circumstances in which they
learned about events that had a strong emotional impact have
commonly affirmed that they had an extremely vivid memory
for these circumstances even years later, and that they were
fairly certain that they could report them accurately (R. Brown
& Kulik, 1977; Christianson & Engelberg, 1999).
Given these unique features of flashbulb memories, the
question arises as to why some emotional events seem to be
so firmly fixed in memory that people claim they will never
forget them and feel as if they are seeing the scene again
exactly as it occurred. Researchers have attempted to answer
these questions by creating and testing models of the
determinants of flashbulb memory formation and
maintenance (e.g., Conway et al., 1994; Er, 2003;
Finkenauer et al., 1998; Tinti et al., 2009). Although they
are not identical, most of these models share important
determinants: surprise, importance or consequentiality,
emotion, rehearsal, and event memory. We briefly review
these features below. We then present a new model that
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accounts for the vividness and certainty associated with
flashbulb memories by positing that event memory and
flashbulb memory result from independent processes.
First, although present in most models, the key role of
surprise hypothesized by R. Brown and Kulik (1977) is
controversial. Some studies have confirmed that surprise is a
necessary determinant of flashbulb memory formation (e.g., Er,
2003; Finkenauer et al., 1998), whereas others have questioned
its indispensability (e.g., Conway et al., 1994; Tinti et al.,
2009). Second, there is a general consensus on the fundamental
role of importance or consequentiality in flashbulb memory
formation (Conway et al., 1994; Finkenauer et al., 1998; Er,
2003; Tinti et al., 2009). As was suggested by Finkenauer et al.,
the core role of this variable can be explained by referring to
appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Frijda, 1993; Lazarus &
Smith, 1988; Scherer, 1984; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1987).
These theories postulate that appraising an event as important
and consequential is a fundamental antecedent of a strong
emotional reaction, which, in turn, promotes memory encoding
and consolidation (for reviews, see Conway et al., 1994;
Finkenauer et al., 1998; Levine & Edelstein, 2009). A third
determinant common to most models of flashbulb memory is
rehearsal . The relation of rehearsal to other variables differs
across models, however. In somemodels, rehearsal is enhanced
by strong emotion (e.g., Er, 2003; Finkenauer et al., 1998), in
others by importance (e.g., Conway et al., 1994). Moreover, in
some models rehearsal directly promotes flashbulb memory
formation (e.g., Conway et al., 1994), whereas in others, its
influence on flashbulb memory is mediated by event memory
(e.g., Finkenauer et al., 1998; Tinti et al., 2009).
Importantly, event memory is the final determinant of
flashbulb memory in several models (e.g., Er, 2003;
Finkenauer et al., 1998; Tinti, et al., 2009). The more detailed
and accurate an individual’s memory for the facts about an
event, the more vivid, detailed, and imbued with certainty is
their memory for the personal context in which they received
the news. As was pointed out by Luminet (2009), “among the
direct predictors of flashbulb memory, importance and
emotionality were very rarely found to be significant, while
event memory seems to be a more systematic significant
predictor” (p. 72). The view that event memory is a direct
determinant of flashbulb memory deserves particular
attention, not only because event memory was not considered
by R. Brown and Kulik (1977), but also because it raises
important questions about the specificity of the construct of
flashbulb memory (Tinti et al., 2009).
In contrast to flashbulb memory, which refers to the
autobiographical context in which a person learned about an
event, event memory refers to memory for factual details
concerning the event itself. As Pezdek (2003) argued, the
details of the event and the autobiographical experience of
the event “are perceived and processed separately, resulting
in separate memories” (p. 1035). By definition, then, flashbulb
memory and event memory differ with respect to their
contents. Flashbulb memories entail a first-person perspective
and involve qualia, and can be considered part of what some
philosophers (e.g., Malcolm, 1963) define as “experiential
memory.” In contrast, event memory consists of factual
information about the original event. For this reason, flashbulb
memory may differ for each person, whereas event memory, if
correctly encoded and stored, should be identical for everyone.
Another important distinction between flashbulb memory
and event memory may be their modes of rehearsal. The
rehearsal of a flashbulb memory, for example during a
conversation, can rely only on autobiographical memory,
whereas the rehearsal of facts concerning an event can rely
on either retrieval of information from autobiographical
memory or consultation of the media. For example, in
describing how they learned the news of the September 11th
terrorist attacks (e.g., where I was, who was with me),
individuals must rely on their autobiographical memories;
rehearsal of these memories, in turn, reinforces the vividness
of flashbulb memory. In contrast, individuals can be exposed
to information about the original event again and again via the
media (e.g., which tower collapsed first, at what time it
collapsed), contributing to the vividness, completeness, and
accuracy of event memory.
These differences between flashbulb memory and event
memory raise questions about how they are related and about
their respective determinants. The methodological constraints
of previous studies have made it difficult to address these
questions. For example, in some studies event memory was
not assessed (e.g., R. Brown & Kulik, 1977). In others, the
circumstances in which people learned of the event
overlapped with the event itself (e.g., Er, 2003). In still others,
the questions used to assess event memory and flashbulb
memory overlapped (e.g., Tinti et al., 2009). Because of these
methodological issues, the relationship between event
memory and flashbulb memory, and whether event memory
is a determinant of flashbulb memory, remain unclear (e.g., Er,
2003; Finkenauer et al., 1998; Tinti et al., 2009). In the present
study, we addressed these questions by considering an event
for which these two types memory could be clearly
distinguished and assessed separately by questionnaire.
Hypotheses
This study was conducted to test two primary hypotheses: (1)
that event memory and flashbulb memory have different
determinants, and (2) that event memory is not necessarily a
direct causal determinant of flashbulb memory. To test these
hypotheses, we identified an emotionally arousing event in
which these two types of memory could be clearly
distinguished, and tested a model in which event memory
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and flashbulb memory are the results of independent
processes. This model is shown in Fig. 1.
As is illustrated in Fig. 1, the hypothesized model starts with
interest. For a public event to lead to the formation and
maintenance of flashbulb memory and event memory, it must
capture a person’s interest because it pertains in someway to his
or her concerns (Pezdek, 2003; Tinti et al., 2009). From interest,
two possible paths to event memory were hypothesized.
According to the first, a fundamental determinant of event
memory is the rehearsal of information about the event through
exposure to the media, which, in turn, is enhanced by the
appraisal of the event’s importance. Importance is not always
essential for event memory, however. As Conway et al. (1994)
noted, “an event of little or no personal importance associated
with only minimal levels of affect may nonetheless be encoded
into long-term memory in terms of the knowledge structures
employed in the processing of that event” (p. 339). That is, the
more we know about a certain topic, the easier it is to integrate
and assimilate information about an event related to it. Thus, a
second path is hypothesized in which prior knowledge
promotes event memory. With respect to the formation and
maintenance of flashbulb memory, a separate path from
importance was hypothesized. Appraising an event as
important can evoke an intense emotional reaction, which is
expected to lead to the rehearsal of the reception context of the
news. This rehearsal may consist of mentally reviewing the
scene or speaking about one’s personal experience with others.
If event memory is a direct determinant of flashbulb
memory, it is much harder to explain why flashbulb memories
have been shown to contain so many errors. However, if, as
hypothesized, event memory and flashbulb memory have












The path is expected to be significant
The path is expected not to be significant
No prediction
Fig. 1 Theoretical model of flashbulb memory and event memory formation and maintenance
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reinforced by media exposure and flashbulb memory arising
separately from emotion and the rehearsal of subjective
experience, then the vivid yet error-prone nature of flashbulb
memories is more easily explained.
In summary, we hypothesized that interest and importance
could simultaneously engender “cold cognition,” leading to
the formation of event memory, and “hot cognition” (cf. C. A.
Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993), stemming from
intense emotion, and leading to the formation of a flashbulb
memory. Importantly, we did not expect to find a significant
relation between event memory and flashbulb memory.
Finally, on the basis of the conflicting findings in previous
research regarding the role of surprise, we tested whether or
not surprise was necessary for flashbulb memory formation,
without making a prediction.
The present study
To test this model, we assessed the memories of Italian
citizens for Italy’s victory in the 2006 Football World Cup
Championship. The final match between the Italian and
French national teams was held on Sunday July 9th in
Berlin, Germany, at the Reuters Olympic Stadium. Italy
defeated France by 5 goals to 3, in a final penalty shootout
after a 1–1 draw at the end of the supplemental time.
This event was of great interest for most Italian citizens,
since football is viewed as the national sport of Italy.
Furthermore, Italy’s victory was an important event because
of its implications for Italian football, and because a national
victory of this type unifies people and gives high prestige to
the nation. Thus, people could consider the event important
because they were football fans, had a strong affective bond
with the national team, or simply because they were Italian.
Whatever its source, the appraisal of high importance was
expected to increase the intensity of emotion aroused.
Appraised importance was also expected to promote two
types of rehearsal. One type of rehearsal is mediated by
emotion and focuses on the person’s experience in the
moment that he or she learns about the victory (e.g., his or
her own happiness and the happiness of others around, the
noise of the honking cars and bursting firecrackers, etc.). The
other type of rehearsal is more akin to a “diary” of the event
and refers to what happened (e.g., who scored a goal, what
was the score when the regular game time elapsed, who failed
to make the decisive penalty kick, etc.). In the first case,
rehearsal would consist in thinking and talking about people’s
own experience, thereby enhancing flashbulb memory,
whereas in the second case, rehearsal would involve repeated
consultation of information about the event in different media,
thereby enhancing event memory. Event memory was also
expected to be enhanced by the individual’s general
knowledge about football (e.g., the players’ names and
positions, the time schedule of a match, etc.), without being
mediated by the importance attributed to the event.
Finally, given its controversial role, we also tested whether
surprise influences the formation of flashbulb memory. In the
present case, the final match was an expected event, but given
the excellence of the two teams involved, people could not
definitively predict the outcome, and thus were expected to
feel some degree of surprise at the end of the match.
Method
Participants and procedure
The participants were 352 Italians. Their ages ranged from 18
to 51 years (M = 23.4 years, SD = 7.3), and 44 % were males.
About 18 months after the championship (December 2007–
January 2008), questionnaires were distributed to students
during classes at Turin University in Italy by two trained
research assistants. The assistants explained the aims of the
study and distributed the questionnaire to the students who
consented to participate (98 %). Completion of the
questionnaire took about 20 min. All of the participants were
informed that the questionnaire was anonymous and that data
would be used for research purposes only.
Measures
The questionnaire assessed flashbulb memories and eight
possible determinants of their formation and maintenance
(e.g., R. Brown & Kulik, 1977; Conway et al., 1994;
Finkenauer et al., 1998; Luminet et al., 2004).1 These
determinants, and the indicators used to measure them, are
described below. The labels of the indicators used in the tables
and in the model path diagram in Fig. 2 are reported in
parentheses. To decide which items to include in composite
variables, we relied on the definition of the theoretical construct
represented by the latent variable, with the restriction that each
latent variable should have at least two indicators.
Flashbulb memory vividness, detail, and certainty Participants
indicated how vivid (Vivid) their image was at the moment they
learned that Italy had won the Championship, using an 11-point
scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). They were
then asked, in an open-ended question, to report all the details of
the image they had in mind. The number of words produced in
response to this question was used as a measure of the level of
detail of participants’ memories (Detail). In three additional
open-ended questions, participants were asked where they were,
who they were with, and what they did when they heard the
news. For each of these three questions, participants also
1 The questionnaire can be requested from the corresponding author.
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indicated how certain they were of their answers using 11-point
scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (completely). The mean
of these three ratings was used as an indicator of certainty of
flashbulb memories (FB_Certain).
Event memory accuracy and certainty Twelve open-ended
questions assessed participants’ ability to recall factual
information about Italy’s victory in the 2006 Football
Championship (e.g., At the end of the regular time, what
was the result of the match? Against which player did
Zidane commit a foul before being expelled?). Responses
were scored 1 if correct and 0 if incorrect. As is common in
analyses involving achievement scales with items scored as
correct or incorrect, items were parceled to improve the
normality and continuity of the variables’ distributions
(Bandalos & Finney, 2001; Landis, Beal, & Tesluk, 2000).
We first estimated a Rasch model to ascertain the
unidimensionality of the 12-item scale (Rasch, 1960). Then
we constructed two equivalent event-knowledge subscales by
summing odd items and even items separately. Accuracy of
event memory was thus measured by the number of correct
answers to the six odd questions (scores ranged from 0 to 6,
Accuracy1) and the number of correct answers to the six even





































































Fig. 2 Standardized parameters of the empirical model of flashbulb memory and event memory formation and maintenance
544 Mem Cogn (2014) 42:539–551
also indicated how certain they were of their response to each
question using an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all ) to
10 (completely ). To balance the number of accuracy and
certainty measures (providing two measures of each), we
calculated the mean certainty for each participant separately
for the six odd items and the six even items (EV_Certain1,
EV_Certain2).
Importance Participants rated how important the event was
for them (ImpPersonal), for family members (ImpRelatives),
and for Italy (ImpNation), using three 11-point scales ranging
from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much).
Emotion Participants were asked to think of the moment they
learned that Italy had won the championship and to rate the
overall intensity of their emotional reaction on an 11-point
scale ranging from 0 (no emotional reaction ) to 10 (extremely
intense emotional reaction ) (Intensity). They also rated the
intensity of nine discrete emotions (sadness, pride, anger,
relief, fear, satisfaction, happiness, regret, fulfillment), using
11-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all ) to 10 (extremely ).
The mean of the ratings for happiness, pride, relief,
fulfillment, and satisfaction was used as an indicator of the
intensity of positive emotion (EmoPos), and the mean of the
ratings for anger, sadness, fear, and regret as an indicator of the
intensity of negative emotion (EmoNeg).
Surprise Participants rated how surprising (Surprise),
unexpected (Unexpect), and incredible (Incredible) they
considered Italy’s victory, using three 11-point scales ranging
from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much).
Rehearsal via media exposure Participants rated how
frequently they followed news about the Italian victory via
TV, radio, newspaper, and the Internet, using four 11-point
scales ranging from 0 (never ) to 10 (very often ). The mean of
these four ratings was used as an indicator of exposure to
media (Frequency). In addition, they indicated how many
hours and minutes they spent during the 24 h after the victory
following news about the event (Time). Answers to this open-
ended question were transformed into minutes.
Rehearsal via speaking and thinking Participants rated how
frequently they spoke about Italy’s victory and the
circumstances in which they learned about it, using two 11-
point scales (0 = never, 10 = very often ). The mean score on
the two scales was considered an indicator of overt rehearsal
(Overt). Participants also rated how frequently they thought
about Italy’s victory and the circumstances in which
they learned about it, using two 11-point scales ranging
from 0 (never ) to 10 (very often ). The mean rating on
these two scales was considered an indicator of covert
rehearsal (Covert).
Knowledge Participants’ general knowledge about football
was assessed using 14 questions (e.g., “What is the name of
the Cagliari stadium?” “How many players can be substituted
during a major league match?”). We followed the same
strategy of item parceling used for event memory, for the
reasons explained above. General knowledge of football was
thus measured by the total numbers of correct answers to the
seven odd questions (scores thus ranging from 0 to 7; Know1)
and to the seven even questions (scores also from 0 to 7;
Know2).
Interest in football Participants indicated how strongly they
supported the Italian national football team (FanNational),
how strongly they supported their favorite football team
(FanTeam), and how much they followed football generally
(Follow), using three 11-point scales ranging from 0 (not at
all ) to 10 (very much ).
Data analysis
The data analysis was conducted in two steps: (1) descriptive
analysis and (2) structural equation modeling to test the
relationships between the different hypothesized determinants
of flashbulb memory and event memory.
Results
Descriptive analyses
The means and standard deviations for study variables are
reported in Table 1. As the table shows, participants reported
that they were rather strong supporters of football, especially
of the national team (FanNational). Their knowledge about
football was moderate, and the standard deviations indicated
large differences among participants in their levels of
knowledge (Know1, Know2). With respect to importance,
participants appraised Italy’s victory as being a very important
event for the nation (ImpNation) and for their relatives
(ImpRelatives), whereas personal importance was evaluated
as being slightly lower (ImpPersonale). Participants had a very
strong overall emotional reaction when they learned about
Italy’s victory (Intensity). Specifically, they reported having
felt intense positive emotion (EmoPos), whereas negative
emotion was reported only at very low intensity (EmoNeg).
Participants rehearsed the circumstances in which they learned
of Italy’s victory frequently, talking about it with others
(Overt), as well as thinking about it (Covert). They also
consulted mass media frequently (Frequency), spending an
average of 100 min following the news about the event during
the 24 h after its occurrence (Time). Participants’mean ratings
of how surprising, unexpected, and incredible (Surprise,
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Unexpect, Incredible) they found Italy’s victory were above
the average value for each of the three scales.
With respect to event memory, participants provided
correct answers to about 50 % of the event memory questions
concerning the football game (Accuracy1, Accuracy2) and
were moderate ly conf ident about thei r answers
(EV_Certain1, EV_Certain2). With respect to flashbulb
memory, participants reported very vivid memories of the
circumstances in which they learned about Italy’s victory
(Vivid). Open-ended reports of the details that participants
recalled about the moment they learned about the event
(Details) averaged 28 words in length, with large individual
differences in the richness of the reports (range = 2 to 92
words). Almost all participants were able to report where they
were (99.1 %), whom they were with (96.3 %), and what they
did (99.1 %) when they learned the news.2 Finally,
participants were extremely certain about their flashbulb
memories (FB_Certain).
Structural equation model
The proposed structural model was tested using LISREL 8.7
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2005). In the structural diagram
presented in Fig. 2, the hypothesized factors underlying the
observed variables are represented by circles, and the
observed variables are represented by squares. The single-
headed arrows indicate the relations between latent factors
and between latent factors and their indicators. The correlation
matrix of the variables used to compute the structural model is
shown in Table 2. Since variables were not multinormal
[Mardia’s test with Prelis, χ2(2, N = 352) = 529.39, p <
.001], we usedMLR (the robust maximum likelihoodmethod)
for estimation. No error terms were allowed to correlate.
The goodness of fit of the model was evaluated by several
indices. Two global fit measures (χ2 and SRMR) were used to
indicate the degree of discrepancy between the sample
covariance matrix and the covariance matrix implied by the
model. A comparative fit measure (CFI) was used to compare
the fit of the hypothesized model with that of the null model.
Finally, the root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) was used to evaluate the approximation of the
model-implied matrix to those of the population. Following
the rules of thumb summarized by Schermelleh-Engel,
Moosbrugger, and Müller (2003), we used the following
criteria for evaluating a model as acceptable: χ2/df < 3,
SRMR < .10, CFI > .95, RMSEA < .08. On the basis of these
conventional cutoffs, the model provides a good statistical fit
to the data, χ2 = 668.79 (df = 264, N = 352), χ2/df = 2.53, p
< .001; SRMR = .080; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .066. Since the
main hypothesis of this work was that event memory does not
causally influence flashbulb memory, we compared this
model to a model in which the path from event memory to
flashbulb memory was constrained to be zero. The Satorra–
Bentler chi-square difference test showed no difference
between the two models, SB χ2(1) = 1.13, p > .05.
As expected, more interest in football predicted greater
prior knowledge and attributing greater importance to the
event. Furthermore, greater importance predicted enhanced
flashbulb memory and event memory via two separate
pathways. The first pathway linked importance with the
intensity of emotion, which, in turn, predicted the frequency
of overt and covert rehearsal. Rehearsal was the only direct
determinant of the formation and maintenance of vivid and
detailed flashbulb memories. This pathway explained 26 % of
the variance for flashbulb memory. The second pathway
linked importance with mass media exposure that enhanced
the accuracy and certainty of event memory. Event memory
was also enhanced by prior knowledge. The second pathway
and prior knowledge explained 74 % of the variance for event
Table 1 Descriptive analyses
Latent Variables Indicators M SD
Interest FanNational 6.15 2.95
FanTeam 5.73 3.39
Follow 5.51 3.11
Knowledge Know1a 3.31 2.27
Know2a 3.35 2.00
Importance ImpPersonal 5.42 3.05
ImpRelatives 7.15 2.48
ImpNation 7.48 2.53
Emotions Intensity 7.96 2.21
EmoPos 7.07 2.56
EmoNeg 2.37 1.61
Rehearsal Overt 5.77 2.66
Covert 5.20 2.87
Media Frequency 4.36 2.69
Time (in minutes) 99.91 109.11
Surprise Surprise 6.83 2.40
Unexpect 6.62 2.64
Incredible 5.58 2.97




Flashbulb memory Vivid 7.07 2.96
Detail (no. of words) 28.12 16.76
FB_Certain 9.08 1.10
a Scale ranged from 0 to 7; b Scale ranged from 0 to 6. If not indicated
otherwise, all scales ranged from 0 to 10
2 Given this ceiling effect, results relative to the canonical categories were
not retained in the model building.
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memory. Importantly, the link between event memory and
flashbulb memory was not statistically significant. Finally,
surprise was not a significant predictor of flashbulb memory.
Discussion
An important unresolved issue in studies of flashbulb memory
has been whether event memory is necessarily a causal
determinant of flashbulbmemory. This issue is important from
a theoretical standpoint because discovering that flashbulb
memories have different determinants than event memories
would support the view that processes specific to flashbulb
memories during encoding invest these memories with unique
characteristics and justify us in considering them special
memories (Christianson, 1989). Finding that flashbulb
memory and event memory originate from two different
processes would also suggest that the processes that maintain
these two types of memories differ. For event memory, details
can be maintained through exposure to media accounts. In
contrast, for flashbulb memory, remembered details originate
from an individual’s own experience and can only be
maintained by thinking about the experience and discussing
it with others. This could facilitate reconstructive processes,
undermining the accuracy of flashbulb memory, while
subjective certainty could remain very high.
Methodological difficulties have hindered investigators’
ability to address whether flashbulb memory and event
memory have unique determinants, however. In some studies,
event memory was not assessed (e.g., R. Brown & Kulik,
1977); in other studies, memory for the circumstances in
which people learned about an event (such as an earthquake)
overlappedwithmemory for the event itself (e.g., Er, 2003); in
still other studies, some of the questions assessing event
memory and flashbulb memory overlapped (e.g., Tinti et al.,
2009). These methodological difficulties may have led
investigators to propose that event memory and flashbulb
memory formation are determined by the same factors (Er,
2003) or that event memory has a direct causal impact on
flashbulb memory (Finkenauer et al., 1998; Tinti et al., 2009).
In the present study, we made use of an event for which it was
possible to clearly distinguish information pertaining to event
memory from information pertaining to flashbulb memory.
This allowed us to assess, through the creation of a structural
equation model, the specific determinants of flashbulb
memory and event memory, and to show that these two types
of memory need not be related.
The resulting model included determinants that are
common to previous models of flashbulb memory (e.g.,
Conway et al., 1994; Er, 2003; Finkenauer et al., 1998),
including prior knowledge, importance, emotion, and
rehearsal. Our model differs from prior models in three
important ways, however. First, our model distinguishes
between interest, or how closely the event is related to an
individual’s concerns (e.g., interest in politics; Conway et al.,
1994), and prior knowledge (e.g., facts known about
Thatcher’s administration; Conway et al., 1994). We found
that interest and prior knowledge have differing influences on
memory for public events: Greater interest promotes both
event memory and flashbulb memory, whereas greater
knowledge is related only to event memory. Specifically, the
greater their interest, the more prior knowledge people have
about an event. Prior knowledge, in turn, enhances the
organization and assimilation of incoming information,
thereby leading to more detailed and accurate event memory.
Interest also promotes more detailed and accurate event
memory in a manner that need not require prior knowledge.
An event that captures interest is frequently something
considered to be important, reflected in our model by a direct
link between interest and importance. Viewing an event as
important also promotes searching for, and attending to,
information about the event in the media, thereby enhancing
event memory. With respect to flashbulb memory formation,
as suggested by previous models (e.g., those of Er, 2003; Tinti
et al., 2009), events viewed as important or consequential
evoke emotional arousal, which, in turn, leads to more
rehearsal of the personal circumstances in which the
individual learned about the event. In our model, rehearsal
of personal circumstances was the only direct determinant of
flashbulb memory.
A second way in which our model differs from prior
models is that, as hypothesized, we found no significant
relation between event memory and flashbulb memory. This
finding was possible because we studied an event for which
these two types of memory were dissociable, and because we
further distinguished between different forms of rehearsal.
Thus, a third way in which our model differs from prior
models is by distinguishing between rehearsal through
reexposure to factual details concerning the event as reported
bymedia and rehearsal of the individual’s personal experience
in the moment that he or she learned the news of the event.
These variables are often combined in models of the
determinants of flashbulb memory (e.g., Finkenauer et al.,
1998). This distinction is crucial, however, because it helps
to explain one of the most discussed and problematic issues in
the research literature on flashbulb memories: their accuracy
(Christianson, 1989; Larsen, 1992; Neisser & Harsch, 1992;
Talarico & Rubin, 2003). As R. Brown and Kulik (1977)
pointed out, rehearsal of the personal context in which an
event was experienced serves to maintain the flashbulb
memory but can also promote memory reconstruction,
rendering flashbulb memories far less complete and accurate
than photographs. They noted that “An actual photograph,
taken by a flashbulb, preserves everything within its scope;
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it is altogether indiscriminate. Our flashbulb memories are not
. . . a flashbulb memory is only somewhat indiscriminate and
is very far from complete. In these respects, it is unlike a
photograph” (1977, p. 75). Thus, R. Brown and Kulik did
not intend their use of the metaphor of a photograph to imply
that flashbulb memories include all details of the scene of the
reception context, nor did the use of this metaphor deny the
possibility that details might be added over time as a result of
reconstructive memory processes.
Our model suggests that flashbulb memories may be
composed of incomplete images of a small number of
perceptual details of the reception context. Since these images
are far from complete, when people retrieve and rehearse a
flashbulb memory, they may attempt to reconstruct the whole
context by relying on those few details, and this reconstructive
process may promote false memories. For example, a person
who learned the news about the September 11th terrorist attacks
while in a bar might have encoded the image of a coffee cup
and the counter. When the person is later asked to recall the
context in which he or she learned the news, he or she may start
from this image and add other details that were not part of the
original experience but that are plausible according to a script
(e.g., they may also recall that the usual bartender was there,
even if this detail could not be correct because the usual
bartender was at home ill that day). Thus, even if accuracy is
not a defining characteristic of flashbulb memory, and those
representations differ from what actually occurred, they may
still be vivid and detailed representations of past events.
Moreover, the finding that event memory and flashbulb
memory result from distinct processes suggests that they may
be independent of each other in some cases. People may recall
details about an event without remembering the circumstances
in which they first learned about it. People may also recall how
they first learned about an event without recalling many details
about the event itself. Both the fact that flashbulb memories can
result from reconstructive processes and the fact that they can
exist independently from event memory merit further research,
because they have important implications for real-world
concerns such as the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.
Another issue that should be addressed in future research is
whether our findings, especially the absence of a significant
relation between event memory and flashbulb memory, can be
replicated with a negative event. Research that tests this model
using an event that evokes positive emotion in some people and
negative emotion in others would be especially valuable,
because it would shed light on the effects of valence on both
event memory and flashbulb memory.
Finally, it should be noted that this study was carried out
18 months after the Italian football victory. Thus, we assessed
people’s recall of the determinants of event and flashbulb
memories. In future research, it would be interesting to test
whether the model can be replicated when assessing flashbulb
memories, event memories, and their determinants
immediately after the event occurred and months later. This
would allow for an assessment of the consistency of flashbulb
memories, as well.
In conclusion, our findings support R. Brown and Kulik’s
(1977) original definition of flashbulb memory as memory of a
person’s own circumstance when first hearing the news of a
striking public event that is characterized by a “primary, ‘live’
quality that is almost perceptual” (p. 74). The main contribution
of this work has been the demonstration that the contents of
flashbulb memory and event memory need not be related and
that their main determinants can be clearly differentiated.
Because flashbulb memory relies on the rehearsal of personal
circumstances, whereas event memory relies on prior knowledge
and media exposure, flashbulb memory contains idiosyncratic
elements and may entail distortions due to reconstructive
processes, whereas the content of event memory is ideally the
same for everyone and is objectively verifiable. These findings
have important implications for a longstanding debate in the field
about the nature of flashbulb memory (Christianson, 1989;
Conway et al., 1994; Finkenauer et al., 1998; Pezdek, 2003; M.
C. Smith, Bibi, & Sheard, 2003). They support the view that
flashbulb memory—defined as memory of a person’s own
circumstances when first hearing the news of a striking public
event—can be considered a distinct type of memory.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
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